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Abstract: Early reviews of the academic literature on the economic effects of state and local 
taxes and expenditures suggested that not enough was known upon which to base policy. The 
reviews called for better data and improvements in empirical methodology. This paper reviews 
studies conducted since the early literature reviews to assess our current state of knowledge. The 
conclusion of the study is that we know more now. But our knowledge is unlikely to ever be 
sufficient to provide universal policy guidance. Rather, we suggest that more research is needed 
on specific state and local policies for specific circumstances, consistent with the general 
principles that guide place-based policy.  
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I. Introduction 
The economic effects of state and local taxes and expenditures on economic outcomes has long 
attracted the attention of policy makers and academic economists alike. Assessing the economic 
effects of a state or local fiscal policy requires identifying what an economy would look like with 
and without the policy. The approaches taken by economists to identifying the effects of state 
and local fiscal policy have been widely varying.  
In his book on state and local economic development policy, Bartik (1991) surveys the 
early literature on the effects of state and local taxes. Bartik reported mixed findings, but on 
average concluded that there was a small or modest negative relationship between most state and 
local taxes and regional growth. McGuire (1992) reviewed the Bartik (1991) book and agreed 
that the literature on the effect of state and local taxes was mixed but concluded that as such the 
literature did not offer sufficient guidance on which to base policy. McGuire disagreed with the 
conclusion that there was an overall negative effect of state and local taxes. In a subsequent 
survey, Wasylenko (1997) also concluded that the findings of the early state and local tax studies 
often contradicted each other and no general conclusions could be drawn. The literature surveys 
noted the wide variation in empirical approaches, data sources, and time periods examined. In a 
subsequent survey, Poot (2000) concluded that better data were needed and methods such as 
instrumental variables or natural experiments were needed to address potential endogeneity 
between growth and fiscal policy.  
Despite a large volume of studies published since the early literature reviews, whether or 
not recent studies have greatly improved our understanding of the economic effects of state and 
local taxes and expenditures has yet to be assessed. Therefore, this paper updates the early 
literature reviews. We assess the current state of knowledge on the issue and derive lessons to be 
learned from the literature for policy making. 
We find that the more recent academic studies have improved upon earlier studies in 
terms of methodology. Recent patterns in the literature include use of more fiscal variables, use 
of more control variables, more routinely addressing potential endogeneity of the state and local 
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fiscal variables, more specification searches, assessing spatial spillover effects, allowing for 
nonlinearity in the fiscal policy effects, increased use of micro (individual) data, assessing the 
sensitivity of estimates to the time period examined, allowing for heterogeneous responses across 
space and increased use of case studies and natural experiments. 
Yet, many of the patterns of the early literature are still evident. Studies routinely 
continue to use aggregate data at the state, metropolitan or county level. The studies still use 
different measures of taxes and tax bases. The balanced budget approach of Helms (1985) is 
much more widely used in aggregate analysis but the studies lack consistency in implementation, 
making it difficult to compare results. Many studies continue to examine long historical periods, 
which may no longer be relevant, and continue to assume homogeneous effects across 
geography.  
Below, we first summarize the literature, including discussing the improvements over the 
early literature. We note the pros and cons of the various approaches in producing policy 
guidance. We provide summary tables of the studies reviewed, including their characteristics and 
primary findings. A primary conclusion of the review of the recent studies is that the estimated 
economic effects of state and local fiscal policy depend upon specific circumstances. To further 
examine the potential influence of underlying circumstances on estimated state and local fiscal 
policy effects then, we update the case study of Rickman and Wang (2018) for states recently 
most increasing or most reducing their personal income tax. The variation in budgetary responses 
to the changes in personal income taxation allows for examination of the relative effects of 
changing various state and local taxes and expenditures. The last section of the paper 
summarizes what can be concluded from this study and suggests directions for future research.  
II. Recent Trends in the Literature 
Tables 1 and 2 list and characterize the papers reviewed in this study. We include both published 
and notable unpublished papers. Table 1 details the coverage of the studies by time and 
geography. The table also includes the outcome and fiscal variables examined and the primary 
findings of the study. Table 2 lists the control variables and notes whether the issues of potential 
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spatial spillovers and heterogeneity were assessed. The table also includes the approach taken to 
address potential endogeneity of the fiscal variables.   
Many of the shortcomings in the early literature have been to some degree addressed in 
the more recent studies. Studies increasingly examined specific fiscal policy instruments rather 
than simply assess the effects of the total tax burden. Most recent studies included numerous 
control variables to reduce the possibility of omitted variable bias. The control variables typically 
accounted for the effects of the national business cycle, state economic cycles, and non-fiscal 
policy economic shocks. Studies using panels of annual data commonly included cross-section 
and time fixed effects as did many studies using panels of five-year changes.  
Improvements in general economic methodology found their way into the state and local 
fiscal policy literature. The issue of endogeneity typically has been addressed, or at least was 
explicitly recognized in most studies. Studies increasingly sought to exploit natural experiments, 
such as using bordering areas or matching estimators. Following the spatial econometric 
literature, there was increased recognition of potential geographic spillovers. A number of 
studies used micro data to more specifically identify the channels of fiscal policy influence. 
Finally, there also has been increased recognition that state and local fiscal policy effects may 
depend on underlying circumstances, shifting across time and geography. This has been 
suggested as one reason for academic studies finding conflicting findings (Ojede and Yamarik, 
2012). 
Below, we discuss the contributions and the limitations of the studies reviewed for 
providing guidance in state and local policy making. We discuss the characteristics of the studies 
and how they contribute to the identification of the economic effects of state and local taxes and 
expenditures. We also summarize the policy lessons that can be drawn from the results of the 
studies. 
II.1 Budgetary Tradeoffs 
Studies using aggregate data increasingly implemented the full balanced-budget (FBB) approach 
of Helms (1985) (Table 1). The FBB approach includes the tax and expenditure categories that 
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make up state and local budgets, omitting at least one category during estimation to avoid perfect 
collinearity. In meta-analysis, Goss (1995) concluded that the early tax studies that did not 
control for the potential positive effects of state and local government services more likely did 
not find a negative effect of taxes. This occurs because reduced taxes more likely increase 
growth when productive government services are held harmless, e.g., by reducing spending on 
welfare (Helms, 1985). In a review of early studies of state and local government services and 
economic development, Fisher (1997) concluded that some government services consistently 
were shown to positively affect economic development, notably highway transportation services, 
while less support was found for education and public safety services.  
Consistent with the early literature, the findings from the more recent aggregate FBB 
studies regarding the relationship between state and local taxes and expenditures are mixed. 
Numerous studies found negative tax effects, but often they were noted as economically small. 
The tax effect can vary in the same study with alternative specifications. Numerous studies also 
found positive spending effects.  
Brown et al. (2003) found negative tax effects but also found some positive spending 
effects. They then assessed the effect of a combined equal increase in each tax and expenditure. 
The general result was that most state and local government services were not underprovided, 
regardless of the tax used to finance the services. The exception was transportation services 
which mostly either increased growth regardless of the tax used to finance them or had no effect. 
Higher sales and property taxes more likely reduced growth compared to higher personal income 
and corporate income taxes. Using a similar model, Taylor and Brown (2006) found comparable 
results for the same period. 
Harden and Hoyt (2003) found that corporate income tax revenue was the only category 
to have significantly negative effects on economic activity and was argued that it should be 
lower than sales taxes. They did not find consistent evidence for any expenditure category. 
Tomljanovich (2004) found only a temporary negative effect of the overall average tax rate. 
Only corporate income tax rates had a positive long-run effect, while state welfare expenditures 
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had a negative effect. Both studies concluded though that overall state and local fiscal policy did 
not much affect state economic growth.  
Allowing for nonlinearities in state and local fiscal policy responses, Bania et al. (2007) 
found that at lower levels, increased taxes to pay for public expenditures on education and 
highways (the omitted categories) had positive effects on state economic activity; the effect 
turned negative as the tax and expenditure shares rose. The study did not examine distinct 
categories of taxes and only considered expenditures on education, highways and other related 
areas as distinct from health and welfare expenditures and other transfers.  
Reed (2008) found significant negative effect of taxes used to fund general state and local 
expenditures; the tax negative tax result held up when used to fund the category of productive 
services relative to welfare expenditures and other non-tax revenues. Goff et al. (2012) also 
examined the effect of the tax burden relative to state government expenditures generally. The 
overall state tax burden was found to reduce growth, a result which was mostly consistent for 
personal income taxes but not corporate income taxes. 
The negative tax effect of Reed (2008) held up in Reed (2009) when using the sensitivity 
analysis method of Leamer (1985) and not holding the level of public expenditures constant. 
Reed noted that the tax effect was modest and also reported that sales taxes and corporate income 
tax had positive effects relative to other taxes. In further analysis of the robustness of state and 
local fiscal policy impacts, Alm and Rogers (2011) found that the estimated tax relationship was 
inconsistent, ranging from negative to positive. The state income personal tax was never 
statistically negative but was sometimes positive and significant. State and local expenditures 
had more consistent and expected estimated relationships.  
Ojede and Yamarik (2012) found a negative long-run tax effect that was slightly smaller 
than that reported by Reed (2008). They found positive productive spending effects relative to 
welfare spending. Sales and property taxes were found to have a negative effect, though there 
was no effect of the personal income tax.  
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Yu and Rickman (2013) examined wage rates and housing prices within the general 
equilibrium framework of Roback (1982) to assess state and local fiscal policy effects on 
nonmetropolitan county household amenity attractiveness and firm productivity. State personal 
income taxes relative to the omitted category were found to negatively affect household amenity 
attractiveness, as did the other categories of taxes including property, sales, and corporate taxes. 
State spending on highways and the environment and housing also increased household amenity 
attractiveness. Yet, state spending on education, health and government administration reduced 
household amenity attractiveness of the nonmetropolitan county. 
In another analysis of state and local fiscal variables and county outcomes, Denaux 
(2007) found that variables set statewide significantly affected county income growth in North 
Carolina; i.e., the corporate income tax, the personal income tax and higher education spending. 
As expected, corporate income taxes reduced income growth, while higher education spending 
increased growth. An equal increase in corporate income taxes and higher education spending 
though slightly reduced growth. But unexpectedly, higher personal income taxes increased 
income growth. Denaux demonstrated the sensitivity of results to omission of various categories 
of taxes and expenditures, suggesting the importance of a full budget-balance approach. A near 
perfect correlation was found though between corporate income taxes and gasoline taxes, 
revealing the hazard of including too many categories of variables and the necessity of omitting 
key categories of variables. 
Based on average state and local tax rates, property taxes were found to have relative 
negative effects on state per capita income growth over the entire period in Gale et al. (2015), 
while corporate income taxes had positive relative effects. Welfare spending had statistically 
negative relative effects, while investment spending − that on state and local airports, highways 
and transit utilities − had no relative effect. When added to the specification the top marginal 
personal income tax rate had no effect and did not alter the other fiscal variable results. 
The results across periods for firm formation and employment relative to population in 
Gale et al. (2015) mirrored those for real per capita income. The top marginal income tax rate 
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statistically reduced firm formation, but the magnitude was small, and had no effect on 
employment. Property taxes had statistically significant negative effects, but quantitatively small, 
effects on both firm formation and employment. Adding controls for government spending and 
other explanatory variables did not change any of the results for firm formation and employment. 
In Segura (2017), state and local government spending was aggregated into investment, 
services or administration. Revenue from property, sales, income taxes plus general charges 
together equaled aggregate own-source revenues. The variation in budget deficits also was 
controlled for in the specification. Among the findings of the study, use of federal transfers to 
fund own-source revenue cuts spurred growth as did using federal funds to pay for budget deficit 
spending. Cuts in investment and service expenditures were found to be preferred to increasing 
own-source revenues to reduce budget deficits. The author interpreted the findings as public 
services not justifying the taxes that pay for them, though the effect of tax cuts was small. 
Ojede et al. (2017) also examined categories of state and local spending and taxes but 
limited the number of categories to avoid multicollinearity. The authors found that spending on 
higher education and highway spending significantly increased per capita personal income 
growth in both the short run and long run. The result held regardless of whether deficit financing 
was used or whether individual income or corporate income taxes were raised.  
The widely varying results using the full budget balance approach point to the difficulty 
in sorting out the effects of specific categories of taxes and spending. Especially problematic is 
the estimated effects of combined equal changes in specific taxes and expenditures. The problem 
is succinctly put by Peltzman (2016, p.2): “We do not have experiments where, say, two 
otherwise identical states raise the same taxes by the same amount but one, say, spends the 
increment on education while the other spends it on highways.”  
II.2 Endogeneity 
The issue of potential endogeneity biasing estimates is more often than not addressed in the 
recent state and local fiscal policy literature (Table 2). The most common approach is to use time 
lags of the fiscal variables. Peltzman (2016) tested for time-series reverse causality using leads 
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and lags of variables. Many of the studies admitted that use of pre-determined variables only 
reduces, and does not necessarily eliminate, the likelihood of endogeneity. As noted by Rickman 
(2015), estimated lagged relationships only reflect the co-movement of the fiscal and outcome 
variables over time. The estimates do not necessarily reflect causal relationships obtained from 
exogenous variation in fiscal variables. There could be some other underlying process that 
produces the lagged time-series relationship between fiscal variables and the outcome variables. 
Similarly, some studies assessed whether there were relationships between how well the 
objects of the study were doing economically and subsequent fiscal policy changes. Moretti and 
Wilson (2017) did find any link between how well innovating firms were performing and later 
tax changes. Border county studies and other matching approaches often attempted to establish 
the absence of differences in pre-existing trends prior to fiscal policy changes (e.g., Ljungqvist 
and Smolyansky, 2016; Rickman and Wang, 2018; Turner and Blagg, 2017).   
The difficulty in finding suitable instruments led to only a few studies using instrumental 
variables estimation. Exceptions of studies using external instruments include Brown et al. 
(2003), Agostini (2007), Hammond and Thompson (2008) and Yu and Rickman (2013). Agostini 
(2007) used dummy variables for statutory and constitutional budget limits as instruments. Yu 
and Rickman (2013) used beginning-of-period levels of the fiscal variables as instruments for 
changes in the fiscal variables and also the percentage of votes cast for the Republican candidate 
in a presidential election and the percentage of presidential election turnout. Agostini and Yu and 
Rickman tested their instruments, finding that they were suitable. GMM estimation also includes 
internally provided instruments (Bania et al., 2007; Bania and Stone, 2008; Segura, 2017). Use 
of lagged variables as instruments in GMM again begs the question of true causality versus 
causality in timing of changes in the variables. 
   Giroud and Rauh (2017) used the narrative approach of Romer and Romer (2010). The 
authors searched news articles during the year of the tax change and up to two years earlier. 
Changes deemed as those made to address a budget deficit or to spur growth were assessed as 
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those exogenous to economic activity. Out of stories found for 107 tax changes, 83 fell into the 
exogenous category.  
II.3 Natural Experiments 
A number of studies implemented research designs that have been argued to be natural 
experiments. Use of events produced by nature attempts to replicate the process of randomized 
experiments in science. Natural events or scenarios can serve as instruments to identify policy 
effects.  
 The most common use of the natural experiment moniker in state and local fiscal studies 
has been in border county studies (e.g., Holcombe and Lacombe, 2004; Thompson and Rohlin, 
2012; Rickman, 2013; Rohlin et al., 2014; Ljungqvist and Smolyanky, 2016; Peltzman, 2016 and 
Turner and Blagg, 2017). Counties along a state border have been argued to share a common 
culture, distance to major markets, geography and history (Holcombe and Lacombe, 2004; 
Rickman, 2013). Differences in economic activity were then argued to be related to differences 
in state and local fiscal policy; identification has been further enhanced by examining differences 
in the changes of state and local fiscal policy (Peltzman, 2016) and to the extent the border 
counties were small relative to the sizes of the states (Rohlin et al., 2014). With the exception of 
Turner and Blagg (2017), the border county studies reviewed found negative effects of higher 
taxes. 
Complications arise that limit simple border county comparisons for identification of 
state and local fiscal policy effects. In their analysis of sales taxes, Thompson and Rohlin (2012) 
recognized that geographic and other barriers may affect cross-border shopping. They therefore 
separately examined counties with higher shares of residents working in another state. 
Identification can be enhanced by specific features of tax policy for border areas such as 
reciprocal agreements that required workers to pay income tax to their state of residence, which 
can negate the potentially negative effects of higher income taxes for firm location but not those 
from corporate income and sales taxes (Rohlin et al., 2014). Peltzman (2016) used statewide 
measures of taxes to reduce the potential for endogeneity of county-level taxes.  
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As with natural experiments generally (Rozenweig and Wolpin, 2000; Sims, 2010), 
border county study results may not generalize to state-level policy making. Border county 
effects may not reflect the influence of state and local government expenditure differences 
between the states at the aggregate level. As noted by Rickman and Wang (2018), border 
counties for many states do not contain the major economic centers in the states. If the difference 
in state and local expenditures that accompany the difference in tax rates affects the major 
economic centers in a state differently than its border counties, recommendations that states 
should reduce taxes because of their effects at the border could be harmful to the overall state 
economy. All else equal, such as the absence of spillover effects, tax and expenditure effects also 
could be expected to be stronger at the border because it only takes a minor adjustment in 
location to take advantage of any fiscal policy differences.  
II.4 Spatial Dimension 
Increased recognition has been given to the potential importance of space in estimating state and 
local fiscal policy effects. Conway and Rork (2006) found no effect of redefining state fiscal 
variables as relative to their neighbors. Goff et al. (2012) estimated regressions using matched 
pairs of states based on geographic contiguity and compared the results to an unmatched cross-
section regression. The authors found the absence of a relationship between taxes and per capita 
gross state product growth when using the cross-section of 48 states, even after adding region 
fixed effects and industry composition variables. But they found a consistently negative and 
statistically significant using matched-pair samples.  
In their analysis of manufacturing plants that relocated, Conroy et al. (2016) included an 
indicator variable for whether the pair of states were neighbors, finding that the majority of 
relocations were between neighboring states. Interacting the explanatory variables with the 
neighbor indicator though did not much affect the results. Ljungqvist and Smolyansky (2016) did 
not find evidence of spillovers between counties along state borders based on an alternative 
sample that included interior counties for one of the states. Harden and Hoyt (2003) included 
neighboring state taxes in the regressions but did not find any statistically significant effects. 
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Gale et al. (2015) reported results robust to controlling for neighboring state taxes and 
expenditures. Peltzman (2016) found spillover effects between border counties that reduced 
estimated negative effects from higher taxes when ignored. 
Reflecting the trend in the regional science literature, studies increasingly accounted for 
spatial spillovers using spatial econometric techniques. Wooster and Lerner (2010) estimated 
their equation using a spatial autoregressive maximum likelihood approach to capture spatial 
dependencies in county retail sales. Using a Spatial Durbin model, Anderson and Bernard (2017) 
found that adding spatial effects in their model affected the estimated effects of the state and 
local tax burden on per capita income growth. Based on estimation with a dynamic Spatial 
Durbin model, Ojede et al. (2017) concluded there were spillover effects of state policy, 
suggesting cooperation was needed among states. Segura (2017) estimated a spatial dynamic 
panel model and found evidence of spatial spillovers that reduced the estimated effects of a 
state’s own fiscal policy.  
The problem with the spatial econometric approach is that statistically significant spatial 
lag variables simply represent correlation among geographic units. The correlation may arise 
from an overall force driving both the region and its neighbors, akin to the “reflection problem” 
of Manski (1993). The overall force, or peer group effect, needs to be accounted for to identify 
causal effects between geographic units (Lee, 2007). So, what may be deemed a spatial spillover 
in spatial econometric estimation, may simply reflect some of the overall group effect, affecting 
the estimates of a region’s responses to its own fiscal policy. 
II.5 Micro-level Data 
Although the bulk of studies reviewed used aggregate data, studies have increasingly used micro-
level data. Felix (2009) examined the effect of the top marginal corporate income tax rate, the 
marginal state individual income tax rate and the sales tax rate on individual wages. Gius (2011) 
assessed how the state personal income tax affected migration between states. Young and Varner 
(2011; 2015), Varner and Young (2012) and Cohen et al. (2015) examined the influence of 
increasing the top marginal personal income tax rate on the migration of high-income earners. 
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Moretti and Wilson (2017) estimated the effect of the corporate income tax and the personal 
income tax of high-income earners on the migration of successful patenting scientists. Giroud 
and Rauh (2017 ) assessed the link between the corporate income tax, gross receipts tax, or other 
business tax, sales tax, property tax, personal income tax on the number of business 
establishments, the accompanying number of employees and capital investment. Zidar (2017) 
linked exogenous federal tax changes and variation in the income distribution across states to 
state economic outcomes.  
By a small margin, a majority of the micro studies reviewed suggested negative tax 
effects, while most of the remaining studies suggested no effect. Micro-level studies have 
limitations similar to those of natural experiments in terms of policy relevance. For example, 
Morretti and Wilson (2017) found that increases in personal income or corporate income tax 
rates reduced net in-migration of “star-scientists.” Because other state and local government 
taxes and expenditures were omitted, the estimated effect by Moretti and Wilson was relative to 
these for the scientists. The effect of the tax changes on state government budgets and overall 
economic performance was not assessed. The top scientists may have not received benefits equal 
to their tax contributions, which would have provided services to others that might have 
benefited the overall state economy and at least in part offset the negative tax effect on the 
scientists. If tax increases or cuts in state and local expenditures are needed to finance tax cuts to 
a segment of the economy, overall economic activity may be harmed. 
II.6 Heterogeneity 
Importantly, studies have increasing recognized heterogeneity across geography and time in 
economic responses to state and local fiscal policies. Case studies implicitly are based on the 
premise of potential heterogeneity. The heterogeneity can arise from a plethora of sources. 
Nationwide Studies 
Relatively unexplored is the potential for nonlinearities in the relationships between state 
and local fiscal variables and economic outcome variables. Bania et al. (2007) noted that in 
endogenous growth models increased taxes can spur, reduce or have no effect on economic 
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activity, depending on the initial level of taxes and expenditures. Because of diminishing 
marginal productivity of productive expenditures, at low levels of taxes and productive 
expenditures, increased taxes can spur growth. The opposite occurs at higher levels of taxes and 
expenditures. Bania et al. (2007) found empirical support for the diminishing marginal 
productivity hypothesis. In Bania et al. (2008), states were ranked in terms of how much their 
growth deviated from the median based on their state and local taxes and expenditures; some 
states could increase growth by increasing taxes and key expenditures, while others could 
increase growth by pursuing an opposite strategy.  
Ojede and Yamarik (2012) reported significant heterogeneity across the states, which 
they suggested as a probable reason why so many studies found conflicting results. The general 
sensitivity of their results to specification caused Anderson and Bernard (2017, p. 13) to 
conclude that the effects of state and local tax changes may depend on the “particular 
environment within and surrounding each state.” 
Harden and Hoyt (2003) found their results to be sensitive to the omission of small states 
on the border with Canada. Hammond and Thompson (2008) found differences between 
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. Peltzman (2016) assessed the sensitivity of border-
county results to county size and type of state boundary, finding modest quantitative differences. 
Thompson and Rohlin (2012) found that ignoring the degree of connectedness of border counties 
can produce biased estimates of state and local tax effects in border county studies. 
Heterogeneity in state and local fiscal policy responses across industries and firms (e.g., Borcher 
et al., 2016; Conroy et al., 2016; Giroud and Rauh, 2017) may produce heterogeneous effects 
across states if they have varying compositions of types of industries and firm types. 
Taylor and Brown (2006) reported that the net effect of the size of state and local 
government changed over time, having negative effects on private economic growth during the 
1980s, but more likely having a neutral effect in the 1990s. Deskins and Hill (2010) suggested 
that own-source tax revenues per capita reduced growth in 1985 but by 2003 had zero effect. 
Gale et al. (2015) reported that the effect of the overall tax burden was negative for 1977-1991 
15 
 
but positive for 1992-2006. Felix (2009) found that an increase in the state corporate tax rate 
reduced wages more during 1992-2005 than 1977-1991, suggesting that increased globalization 
over time may in part underlie the result. The overall tax burden variable generally was 
insignificant over a long time period (1934-2004) in Bauer et al. (2012), with the exception of a 
couple of sub-periods (1964-1979 and 1984-2004) when state fixed effects were not included in 
the model. 
Case Studies 
The sensitivity of the estimated effect to geography and time is one reason many studies use the 
case study approach. Case studies typically focus on one area or group of areas and a particular 
time period. Although the results cannot be as readily generalized to all areas as nationwide 
studies, case studies may be more relevant for an individual state or locality considering fiscal 
policy changes.  
Denaux (2007) assessed the effects of state and local taxes on real per capita income 
growth in North Carolina counties for the period 1980-1995. Wooster and Lehner (2010) 
examined the effect of the high sales tax in the state of Washington using real per capita retail 
sales data for its counties over the 1992 to 2006 period. The micro-data studies of Young and 
Varner (2011) and Cohen et al. (2015) discussed above were of New Jersey, while that of Varner 
and Young (2012) was of California. 
Rickman (2013) compared economic growth in counties across Oklahoma and its 
neighboring states during 1990 to 2010, paying particular attention to Texas because of its 
absence of personal and corporate income taxes. The author noted that the choice of direct 
comparison of Oklahoma with Texas was based on methodological issues that arise in most 
comprehensive studies of the U.S. Because previous growth advantages of state and local fiscal 
policy already in place could have been capitalized into wages and prices, Wang (2016) 
examined whether the pattern of wages and land costs in Texas revealed any advantages of their 
state and local fiscal policy relative to Oklahoma. It might be that the lack of an income tax in 
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Texas conferred it a competitive advantage, but it subsequently was offset by the higher wages 
and land rents that resulted.  
  In direct response to heterogeneity found in the nationwide studies, Rickman and Wang 
(2018) used the synthetic control method (SCM) matching approach (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 
2003; Abadie et al., 2010; 2015) in case studies of Kansas and Wisconsin with the election of 
their governors in 2010. Kansas has been labelled as “one of the cleanest experiments for 
measuring  the effects of tax cuts on economic growth in the U.S.” (Gale, 2017). Using SCM, 
Rickman and Wang constructed control groups for counterfactual comparisons from weighted-
averages of other states. The states used for comparison and weights assigned were based on 
matching pre-intervention characteristics of the states and pre-intervention paths of the growth 
variables. The matching of characteristics prior to the period of analysis and matching of pre-
treatment trends reduced concerns with the endogeneity of the fiscal variables with economic 
growth and controlled for national and state economic cycles. 
II.7 Key Lessons from the Literature for State and Local Fiscal Policy 
Consistent with the reviews of the early literature, a review of the more recent literature above 
reveals widely varying findings. No clear consensus on the economic effects state and local 
fiscal policy that can be universally applied emerges from the studies. But the studies reveal a 
number of useful insights. 
1) The overall state and local tax burden is not a major driver of economic growth differences 
across states. 
The vast majority of the academic studies that examined the relationship between state and local 
taxes and economic growth found little or no effect. Where significant effects were found, they 
generally were modest at most. A corollary then is that tax cuts do not pay for themselves. Even 
the most negative growth effects reported for higher taxes were far from sufficient to produce 
revenue growth that would be necessary to offset the direct revenue losses that occur when taxes 
are reduced. 
2) Less is known about the effects of one tax or expenditure versus another.   
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Personal income, corporate income, and sales taxes all have been found have no economic 
effects, positive effects or negative effects, relative to other taxes and expenditures. Even less is 
known about the relative growth effects of different state expenditures. The limited studies that 
have examined state expenditures typically have assessed the effects of investment spending 
such as education and highway spending versus welfare spending. The growth effects range from 
positive to negative for education and highway spending. Welfare spending typically was either 
found to have negative growth effects or no effect, when considering the taxes required to 
finance the spending. The conclusions often were affected by the choice of tax and expenditure 
variables to include in the analysis.    
3) No single study can answer the question of whether a state should increase or decrease its 
tax burden. 
The estimated relationship between taxes and growth is highly sensitive to the empirical 
approach used with each approach having its advantages and disadvantages. Policy makers 
should not cherry pick among the studies to only find evidence on one side of the debate. Simple 
economic growth comparisons used in non-academic studies of state and local taxes and 
spending (e.g., Arduin, Laffer and Moore Econometrics, 2011; Davies and Buffie, 2017) can be 
especially mis-leading and should not be used for policy making. Such studies make no attempt 
at identification, which the literature reveals is crucial to the understanding of state and local 
fiscal policy. Anecdotal stories and individual outcomes alone should not be the basis of policy. 
Although anecdotal stories and studies of individual outcomes provide context and insight, there 
are aggregate effects of state and local fiscal policy based on complex economic interactions and 
synergies that cannot be predicted by simple extrapolation of individual outcomes. An overall 
assessment of the state and local fiscal policy literature and knowledge of recent economic and 
policy trends at a minimum are required. 
4) The estimated state and local tax burden effect has changed over time.  
Most of the reported negative growth effects of higher state and local taxes were based on data 
prior to the last ten or twenty years. Studies using more recent aggregate data more likely found 
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no effect or positive effects of increased taxes (Taylor and Brown, 2006; Deskins and Hill, 2010; 
Gale et al., 2015). One possibility for the result that was mentioned in some studies is that states 
have become more similar in their tax and spending patterns and were more growth promoting in 
their fiscal policies (Taylor and Brown, 2006; Deskins and Hill, 2010). 
5) The effect of state and local tax changes on growth likely depends on the national economic 
environment, as well as the economic environment in the state and neighboring states. 
Some of the studies, particularly the case studies, suggested heterogeneous effects across states 
(e.g., Anderson and Bernard, 2017; Rickman and Wang, 2018). Differences in estimated effects 
may relate to differences in culture, demography, history and industry structure. The 
heterogeneity of results also may relate to differences in initial conditions. Cuts in taxes and 
spending more likely stimulate growth in states starting with a high overall tax burden (Bania et 
al., 2007; Bania and Stone, 2008). Reductions in state and local government spending may have 
particularly negative multiplier effects on the rest of the economy during periods when the 
national economy is below full employment (such as in the years following the Great Recession) 
that are not offset by positive supply-side effects of the corresponding lower taxes (Rickman and 
Wang, 2018). 
6) State and local taxes and expenditures may affect the economies of neighboring states. 
A number of studies found spillover effects of state and local expenditures on neighboring 
economies (Wooster and Lerner, 2010; Anderson and Bernard, 2017; Ojede et al., 2017; Segura, 
2017). The existence of spillovers could have a number of potential implications for state and 
local fiscal policy, both in terms of potential cooperation and competition.  
III. Recent Experiments 
We further investigate how much state and local fiscal policy effects may depend on particular 
circumstances by updating and expanding the case study analysis of Rickman and Wang (2018). 
We examine the performance of states that in recent years made notable changes in state fiscal 
policy, particularly in personal income taxes. Because the states differed in the changes made to 
other taxes and expenditures in response to the personal income tax changes we also may be able 
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provide more insights in the spirit of the ideal experiment that Peltzman (2016) lamented did not 
exist. Another advantage is that the states are examined in entirety and reflect the economic 
response to all budgetary adjustments. The three indicators of economic performance examined 
are total nonfarm wage and salary employment, per capita personal income, and real per capita 
gross state product. These are the three indicators most often examined in the state and local 
fiscal policy literature.  
III.1 The Experiments and the Empirical Approach 
The states examined are those for which notable tax changes were made during 2011-2015. 
Kansas, Maine, Ohio and Wisconsin were among the states that enacted the largest cuts in 
personal income taxes during the period (Rickman and Wang, 2018). North Carolina 
dramatically cut taxes but they did not take effect January 2014, which allows less time for 
evaluation. Indiana likewise enacted a significant tax cut that took effect in Fiscal Year 2014. 
Outside of Hawaii, California and Minnesota were the two states with the largest increases in 
personal income taxes during the period. Thus, we examine the states of California, Kansas, 
Maine, Minnesota, Ohio and Wisconsin during the period. 
Table 3 shows the change in state ranking over 2011-2015 for the categories of fiscal 
variables. The rank is based on the change in the revenue/expenditure category divided by 
personal income. With its rank of 50 in the category, for example, we see that Kansas had the 
largest reduction in personal income taxes as a share of income. The states varied in terms of 
changes in other taxes and expenditures.  
We implement the synthetic control method (SCM) used by Rickman and Wang (2018), 
which is reviewed in Section III. Control groups are constructed for counterfactual comparisons 
from weighted-averages of other states. The states used in the construction of the control 
(counterfactual) units and weights assigned are based on matching pre-intervention 
characteristics of the states and pre-intervention growth paths of the economic outcome 
variables. Energy and mining states are removed from consideration of serving as a donor in the 
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construction of the counterfactual units to create a donor pool of states more likely to have a 
similar economic growth process (Abaide et al., 2015). 
Characteristics of the states used in the matching are from Rickman and Wang (2018) and 
include: natural amenity attractiveness;  position in the rural-urban hierarchy; manufacturing 
dependence; mining dependence; farm dependence; persistent poverty status; retirement 
destination; recreation dependence; long-term population loss region; population density; shift-
share industry mix employment growth at the four-digit level (2002-2007); educational 
attainment among the adult population; and Fraser’s Economic Freedom Index (Goetz et al., 
2011). Except for industry mix employment growth, the characteristics are based on data prior to 
the beginning of the pre-treatment period. The matching of characteristics prior to the period of 
analysis and matching of pre-treatment trends reduces the likelihood of endogeneity of the fiscal 
variables with economic growth. 
For each of the six states, a synthetic control analysis is performed for total nonfarm 
wage and salary employment, real per capita gross state product (GSP) and per capita income. 
With 2011 as the treatment year, the years used in the matching of the state and the construction 
of the synthetic control for each variable are 2006-2011; Rickman and Wang (2018) reported that 
the results for Kansas and Wisconsin were robust to expanding the pre-treatment period to 2001-
2011. The comparison for fiscal policy analysis are based on the growth path of the state from 
2011-2016 relative to the growth path of its synthetic control (counterfactual) unit. The 
predictions for the synthetic control units are simply the state weights applied to the economic 
variable of interest from 2011-2016. 
III.2 Outcomes of the Experiments 
For each tax-changing state, Table 4 shows the average state weight across the three economic 
outcome variables for each of the respective synthetic control units. The average state weights 
are then used to calculate the difference in ranking for each fiscal variable change (2011-2016) 
for each tax-changing-state relative to its synthetic control unit. The weights similarly are used to 
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calculate the difference for each outcome variable between the tax changing states and their 
synthetic control units. 
The differences in rankings between the state fiscal policy changes and those of the 
corresponding synthetic control units are displayed in Table 5. For each of the six tax-changing-
states, for each tax and expenditure category, the change in ranking for each donor state is 
multiplied by the synthetic control weight, and then summed. The difference between the tax-
changing-state and the weighted-sum, rounded to the nearest integer, is reported in Table 5 for 
each tax and expenditure category.  
Regarding the change for personal income taxes, the large positive numbers for Kansas, 
Maine, Ohio and Wisconsin reveal that the ranking in the change in personal income taxes as a 
share of personal income was much lower for these states than for those of their corresponding 
synthetic control units; i.e., these states moved down in the rankings for the effective personal 
income tax rate more than their respective synthetic control units. For California and Minnesota, 
the very negative numbers indicate that the two states increased their effective personal income 
tax rate rankings relative to those of their respective synthetic control units. 
In order, the four states with the largest weights in the construction of California’s 
synthetic control (column 1 in Table 4) are Arizona, Florida, Connecticut and Washington. 
Figure 1 shows the SCM results for California. For all three variables California considerably 
outperforms its synthetic control unit. The difference in rankings shown in the first column of 
Table 5 reveals that relative to its synthetic control unit California had a large relative increase in 
its personal income tax share. The ranking of the change in California’s own source revenues 
overall is fairly comparable to that of its synthetic control unit. The increased personal income 
tax change for California was offset by the lower ranking for the change in the sales tax and 
gross receipt tax share, the property tax share and the corporate income tax share; i.e., these tax 
shares decreased in California compared to its synthetic control unit. Compared to its synthetic 
control unit, California reduced its state and local education expenditure share and increased its 
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public welfare expenditure share. Total state and local expenditures only decreased slightly 
relative to its synthetic control unit. 
The four states with the largest weights in the construction of the synthetic control unit 
for Kansas are South Dakota, Washington, Nebraska and Idaho (column two of Table 4). 
Figure 2 shows the SCM results for Kansas. Kansas underperforms its synthetic control unit for 
real per capita GSP and total nonfarm wage and salary employment. By 2016, there was only a 
minor difference in per capita income between Kansas and it synthetic control unit. Personal 
income taxes and property taxes as shares of personal income decreased considerably in Kansas 
relative to its average synthetic control unit based on the relative change in rankings shown in 
column 2 in Table 5. The sales tax and gross receipt share increased considerably, as did the 
corporate income tax share. There was no change in ranking between Kansas and its synthetic 
control unit for own source revenues overall. Along with significantly increasing its sales tax, 
Kansas drained its rainy day account and shifted funds to offset the loss of personal income tax 
revenue (Turner and Blagg, 2017). So, the relative total state and local expenditure share 
increased. Education and transportation expenditures increased relative to the synthetic control 
unit, while there was no change in relative ranking of public welfare expenditures. 
For Maine, the states with the largest weights in the construction of the synthetic control 
unit are Alabama, Missouri, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey and Vermont (column 3 
of Table 4). Figure 3 shows the SCM results for Maine. Maine underperforms its synthetic 
control unit for real per capita GSP and total nonfarm wage and salary employment. But there 
was only a slight difference in per capita income growth between Maine and it synthetic control 
unit during the 2011-2016 period.  
Relative to its synthetic control unit, Maine had much greater reductions in personal 
income and corporate income taxes (column 3 of Table 5). But Maine had greater relative 
increases in sales and gross receipts and property taxes as shares of personal income. Overall, the 
relative own source revenue share increased by five in the rankings; the relative total state and 
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local expenditure share decreased by eight. State and local expenditures on education, 
transportation, and public welfare all decreased considerably relative to its synthetic control unit. 
The largest weights for the synthetic control for Minnesota are Michigan, Iowa, New 
York and Vermont (column 4 of Table 4). Figure 4 shows the SCM results for Minnesota. 
Minnesota’s growth in real per capita GSP exceeds that of the synthetic control. But there is not 
much difference in growth in the other two indicators for Minnesota and its synthetic control. 
Based on the differences in rankings for the change in fiscal category shares, Minnesota 
experienced much larger increases in personal income taxes, sales taxes and corporate income 
taxes (column 4 of Table 5). Only for property taxes did Minnesota’s ranking decrease relative to 
its synthetic control. For total own source revenues Minnesota considerably increased its relative 
ranking. The share of total state and local government expenditures increased in Minnesota 
relative to its synthetic control. Transportation expenditures experienced the largest relative 
increase in Minnesota. 
The states with the largest weights for Ohio are Michigan, Indiana, and Alabama (column 
5 of Table 4). Tied for fourth are Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Tennessee. Figure 5 shows the 
SCM results for Ohio. Ohio’s growth in real per capita GSP exceeds that of the synthetic control. 
But there is not much difference in growth in the other two indicators for Ohio and its synthetic 
control. Ohio had a significant relative decrease in state and local government expenditures, 
which shows up in expenditures on education and public welfare (column 4 of Table 5). State 
and local expenditures on transportation in Ohio increased relative to its synthetic control.  
Finally, for Wisconsin, the largest weights are for Iowa, New Hampshire, Indiana and 
Michigan (column 5 of Table 4). Figure 6 shows the SCM results for Wisconsin. Wisconsin’s 
growth in real per capita GSP and total nonfarm wage and salary employment are much lower 
than those of the synthetic control unit. Wisconsin’s growth in per capita income slightly exceeds 
that of the synthetic control. The ranking of Wisconsin’s personal income tax and property tax 
shares of personal income dropped considerably relative to those of the synthetic control units 
(column 5 of Table 5). The other relative tax shares did not change much, leading to a drop in the 
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relative own source revenue share. Wisconsin’s total state and local expenditure share fell 
relative to its synthetic control. The expenditure drop shows up in relative state and local 
expenditures on education.  
III.3 Key Lessons from the Six States’ Fiscal Experiments  
1. States recently reducing their personal income taxes more likely harmed economic growth 
and states increasing their personal income taxes more likely spurred their economic growth. 
Across eighteen possible outcomes, six states and three economic outcome variables, the most 
likely result is stronger growth from higher personal income taxes. The next likely outcome is no 
effect, while the least likely outcome is a negative growth effect from higher personal income 
taxes. This is consistent with the case studies of Kansas and Wisconsin by Rickman and Wang 
(2018). 
2. The economic growth differences were not narrowing over time as would be predicted by 
supply responses taking time to have an effect. 
For the nine economic outcomes supporting improved growth from higher personal income 
taxes, the differences in growth generally were widening in 2016. If supply responses began 
kicking in by 2016, the growth differences would have narrowed. If supply responses do 
ultimately occur, they are not doing so within a time frame that allows states to avoid cutting 
spending or raising other taxes to offset the loss of revenue from the reductions in personal 
income taxes. This is confirmed by the personal income tax cutting states either increasing other 
taxes or reducing total expenditures. 
3. Studies should examine, and policy discussion should involve, more than a single economic 
indicator variable. 
Per capita income was the least affected economic outcome by the tax changes. Only for 
California was per capita income greatly affected. This suggests that the emphasis on per capita 
income in the academic literature over other economic indicators is misguided. The focus on per 
capita income most likely follows from its use in national economic growth studies. At the 
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regional level, increased wages and income can alternatively reflect either a positive labor 
demand effect or a negative labor supply effect.  
4. Comparisons to border states alone are not sufficient to evaluate the effectiveness of state 
and local tax and expenditure changes. 
Border states typically differ in important ways, including industry structure, educational 
attainment, amenity attractiveness and degree of urbanization. The Synthetic Control Method 
applied above revealed that states are better characterized as weighted averages of states, which 
may not always include a border state.  
5. The differences in outcomes cannot be simply explained by differences in the changes in total 
state and local expenditures. 
Among the tax cutting states, Ohio cut state and local expenditures the most, while Kansas cut 
them the least (not shown). Ohio had the thirteenth largest state and local expenditure share of 
personal income in 2011, while Kansas had the thirty-eighth. Minnesota increased expenditures 
more than California; California ranked ninth in 2011 and Minnesota ranked twenty-eighth.  
6. There is an absence of clear evidence on whether other taxes affect economic activity 
differently than personal income taxes. 
Based on the change in rankings from 2011 to 2015, Kansas switched from personal income 
taxes to sales, gross receipts and corporate income taxes. Ohio switched most strongly to sales 
taxes. Maine switched to sales and property taxes. Wisconsin saw a strong increase in 
miscellaneous revenues and a large drop in property taxes. California relatively reduced sales, 
property and corporate income taxes in response to increased personal income taxes. Minnesota 
increased corporate income taxes and sales taxes modestly, but it strongly reduced property 
taxes. 
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7. The pattern is mixed on economic growth and individual categories of state and local 
expenditures, though there is some evidence supporting balanced spending in education and 
transportation. 
Ohio increased transportation expenditures as a share of personal income, while reducing 
education expenditures and public welfare expenditures. Ohio improved its ranking in 
transportation expenditures from fortieth in 2011 to thirtieth in 2015 (not shown); its ranking 
dropped from sixteenth to twentieth for education expenditures. Ohio had the largest relative 
drop in welfare spending in the nation. Possibly, the rebalancing of expenditures was growth 
promoting for Ohio relative to the other tax-cutting states.  
Wisconsin improved its transportation spending ranking from seventeenth in 2011 to 
thirteenth in 2015. Unlike Ohio, it is less likely that Wisconsin was under spending in 
transportation services. Wisconsin fell from fifteenth to nineteenth over the period in education 
spending, though still ranking in the top half of states. Only Wisconsin had a larger than typical 
relative increase in public welfare spending. 
Maine fell from twenty-eighth to thirty-first in education spending from 2011 to 2015, 
likely placing it in the under-spending area among states in terms of education spending needed 
to promote growth. It had yet larger drops in relative spending in transportation and public 
welfare though it remained twelfth in transportation spending and tenth in welfare spending. 
Relative transportation expenditures increased considerably in Minnesota, while relative 
public welfare expenditures increased strongly in California. California also saw a notable drop 
in the state and local education expenditure share.  
IV. Conclusion 
We do know more now about the relationship between state and local fiscal policy and economic 
activity. But consistent with the conclusions of the early literature reviews we still do not know 
enough to offer recommendations on specific policies that are applicable in all circumstances. 
Findings on the effects of the overall tax burden, and especially on the relative effects of various 
categories of taxes and expenditures, continue to vary widely across studies. This likely in part 
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occurs because of the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches to addressing the issue 
of identification and to differing model specifications. The mixed results also likely occur 
because of the differences in underlying circumstances of the studies. Consistent with Alm’s 
(2017, p. 835) observation on economic policy advice more generally, it may be too much to ask 
that economists provide advice on state and local taxes and expenditures “that apply in all 
circumstances.”  
Economists may be most useful in helping policy makers avoid pursuing potentially 
harmful actions by getting them to proceed cautiously with minds wide open to all possible 
consequences when considering possible fiscal policy actions. Unfortunately, the lack of 
consensus in the economics profession on state and local fiscal policy often leaves policy makers 
willing to base decisions on ideology, or on non-academic analyses that make little or no attempt 
at identification and reflect nothing more than spurious correlations. If the goal is to enhance 
economic activity, the complexity of the issue revealed in this review suggests that policy makers 
should eschew ideology and non-academic analyses.  
We can conclude that state and local tax fiscal policy is not predictably a major driver of 
economic growth in the U.S., particularly in more recent decades. There does not appear to be 
any economic benefit from deviating greatly from other states in the structure of state and local 
fiscal policy. The studies of Bania et al. (2007) and Bania and Stone (2008), along with the SCM 
analysis above suggest nonlinearities in the economic effects of state and local taxes and 
expenditures. A state’s neighbors also are not necessarily the best model for its fiscal policies. 
Not only should non-academic studies be avoided, no single study should be the basis of policy. 
Circumstances vary too widely both across geography and time. There is not enough evidence to 
support the reduction in one tax, e.g., personal income taxes, or an increase in one expenditure 
category in all circumstances. More than one indicator of economic activity should be used in 
evaluating state economic performance; the indicators should reflect economic welfare of the 
region, which may not necessarily be those used to assess national economic performance or the 
performance of other types of regions.  
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Research on empirical methodology likely will continue to evolve and provide further 
knowledge on the nexus between state and local fiscal policy and economic activity. But it may 
be too much to ever expect universal definitive conclusions. More research should be conducted 
for specific economic and policy circumstances. Consistent with place-based policy generally, 
fiscal policy should be tailored to the culture, economy, history, institutions and politics of the 
state. Economic conditions of the nation and broader region also may influence the effects of 
specific state and local fiscal policy actions. What may be most needed is research carried out in 
cooperation with policy makers and stakeholders so that the research more directly answers the 
questions they have in particular circumstances.    
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Table 1. Summary of State and Local Fiscal Policy Studies Reviewed Part 1 
Nationwide Studies  
Study Sample Empirical 
Approach 
Fiscal Variables  Findings 
Brown et al. (2003) 1977-1997; 
contiguous 48  
states 
annual; state 
output, private 
capital and 
employment 
full balanced-budget (FBB) 
approach; all but miscellaneous 
revenues and deficit spending  
negative tax effects positive spending 
effects; state and local services generally 
are not underprovided  
Harden and Hoyt (2003) 1980-1994; 
contiguous 48  
states 
annual; 
employment 
FBB approach; personal, 
corporate, sales, other taxes; 
hospitals, education, highway 
expenditures  
negative effect of corporate income taxes; 
no effect for income and sales taxes; only 
education expenditures have a positive 
effect 
Holcombe and Lacombe 
(2004) 
1960-1990; 
counties along  
state borders 
thirty-year growth;  
per capita income  
top marginal personal income 
tax rate; state and local per 
capita expenditures and  average 
state tax rate 
negative effect of top marginal personal 
income tax rate and other taxes; positive 
expenditure effect 
Tomljanovich (2004) 1972 to 1998; 
all  states 
annual; per capita 
gross domestic 
product growth 
FBB approach; total state 
revenues and expenditures; 
property, sales, corporate and 
personal income tax rates; 
education, welfare, highway, 
hospital 
temporary negative effect of overall tax 
rate; only corporate income tax rates have 
positively long run effect, while state 
welfare expenditures have a negative 
effect. 
Taylor and Brown 
(2006) 
1977 to 1997; 
contiguous 48  
states 
annual; ten-year 
rolling windows; 
state output, 
private capital, 
employment 
FBB approach; all but 
miscellaneous revenues and 
deficit spending 
size of state and local government  had 
negative effects on private economic 
growth during the 1980s, more likely 
neutral in 1990s, positive for 
transportation services and negative for 
primary/secondary education 
Conway and Rork 
(2006) 
1970; 1980; 
1990 and 2000, 
all states  
five-year change 
of residence; 
interstate 
migration 
estate, inheritance gift (EIG) 
taxes; expenditures on health and 
hospitals; 
no effect of EIG taxes; health and hospital 
expenditures attracted elderly relative to 
youth 
Bania et al. (2007) 1962 to 1997;  
all states, except 
Alaska 
five-year changes; 
real personal 
income per capita 
growth 
FBB approach; total state and 
local non-deficit revenues; 
health, welfare and other transfer 
payment expenditures combined, 
sum of expenditures on 
highways, education, and other 
at lower levels, increased taxes to pay for 
public expenditures on education and 
highways have positive effects, the effect 
turns negative as the tax and expenditure 
shares rise 
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publicly provided inputs 
Agostini (2007) 1974, 1980, 
1987, 1992 and 
1997; all states 
long (5-7 years) 
changes; foreign 
direct investment 
state corporate income taxes negative effect of state corporate tax rate 
on state’s share of FDI received  
Hammond and 
Thompson (2008) 
1969-1999; 
722 labor 
market areas 
annual; real per 
capita income 
total tax revenue; public capital 
investment; presence of colleges 
and universities 
importance of human capital for growth; 
little correlation between public capital 
outlays and income growth 
Bania and Stone (2008) 1962 to 2002;  
all states, except 
Alaska 
five-year changes; 
real per capita 
personal income 
growth 
FBB approach; total state and 
local non-deficit revenues; 
health, welfare and other transfer 
payment expenditures combined, 
sum of expenditures on 
highways, education, and other 
publicly provided inputs 
Bania et al. (2007) results plus state 
ranking for 2004; Oklahoma had the 
eleventh largest predicted potential 
improvement in income growth from 
increasing taxes to fund productive 
services   
Coomes and Hoyt (2008) 44 multistate 
metropolitan 
areas, 286 
counties in 37 
states; 1992-
2002 
in-movers of 
taxpayers; adjusted 
gross income 
(AGI) of in-
movers 
FBB approach; state and local 
personal income, corporate 
income, property, sales taxes; 
primary and secondary 
education; higher education; fire; 
police; parks; highways 
negative effect on in-movers from 
personal income and sales taxes, and from 
fire safety expenditures; positive effect 
from highway expenditures; negative 
effect on  AGI per in-mover from personal 
income tax rate and positive effect from 
primary and secondary education 
spending 
Reed (2008) 1970 to 1999; 
lower 48 states 
five-year changes; 
per capita personal 
income growth 
FBB approach; ratio of state and 
local taxes to personal income; 
public welfare expenditures; 
productive (non-welfare 
expenditures) 
significant negative effect of taxes used to 
fund general state and local expenditures 
Reed (2009) 1970 to 1999; 
lower 48 states 
five-year changes; 
per capita personal 
income growth; 
extreme bounds 
analysis of Reed 
(2008) 
FBB approach; ratio of state and 
local taxes to personal income; 
public welfare expenditures; 
productive (non-welfare 
expenditures) 
negative effect of tax burden on growth 
across a wide range of specifications, 
though the effect is modest; reports that 
sales taxes and the corporate income tax 
have positive effects relative to other 
taxes 
Felix (2009) 1977 to 2005; 
individuals,  all 
states 
cross-sectional 
every five year; 
wage rates 
top marginal corporate income 
tax rate;  
marginal state individual income 
tax rate; sales tax 
 
corporate income tax consistent negative 
effect, mostly positive effect of individual 
income and sales taxes 
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Deskins and Hill (2010) 1985 to 2003; 
all fifty states 
annual; 
employment, gross 
state product 
own-source tax revenues per 
capita 
own-source tax revenues per capita 
reduced growth in 1985 but by 2003 had 
zero effect 
Goetz et al. (2011) 2000 to 2007; 
lower 48 U.S. 
States 
cross-sectional 
growth; 
employment rate; 
poverty rate; per 
capita income; 
income inequality  
highway miles per capita; 
personal income shares of public 
expenditures on education, 
public safety, health and the 
environment; estate tax, the 
property tax share and the top 
marginal corporate income and 
personal income tax rates 
no relationship between the top marginal 
personal income tax rate, the top corporate 
income tax rate, or the effective property 
tax rate with any outcome variable; no 
effect from having a greater variety of tax 
incentive programs; only positive 
influence on growth is from highway 
miles per capita 
Gius (2011) 1993–1994, 
2000–2002, 
2004–2005; 
individuals 
interstate 
migration 
personal income tax burdens individuals were more likely to have 
moved to a state with a lower tax burden 
Alm and Rogers (2011) 1947 to 1997; 
lower 48 states 
annual; real per 
capita income 
growth 
FBB approach; all categories of 
state and local expenditures and 
taxes from State Government 
Finances report 
estimated tax relationships range from 
negative, positive, or zero; state income 
personal tax is never statistically negative 
but is sometimes positive and significant; 
expenditures have more consistent and 
expected estimated relationships (except 
highway expenditures) 
Bauer et al. (2012) 1934 to 2004; 
lower 48 states 
five-year changes; 
per capita income 
state total tax revenue net of 
revenue from severance taxes 
over state personal income 
serves as the measure of the state 
tax burden 
over the entire period, the tax variable is 
insignificant; negative and significant for 
the sub-periods of 1964-1979 and 1984-
2004 without state fixed effects 
Bruce and Deskins 
(2012) 
1989-2002;  all 
fifty states 
change in two 
measures of 
entrepreneurship  
 
top marginal personal and 
corporate income tax rates; sales 
tax rate; inheritance, estate and 
gift tax 
no economically meaningful effects of 
state taxes on entrepreneurial activity; 
negative effects of higher top marginal 
personal income tax rate and the existence 
of a state-level estate, inheritance, or gift 
tax; more progressive individual income 
taxes associated with  higher 
entrepreneurship rates 
Ojede and Yamarik 
(2012) 
1967-2008; 
lower 48 states 
personal income 
(net of transfers) 
growth 
FBB approach; total tax burden; 
intergovernmental aid; state and 
local deficit; personal income 
long-run negative tax effect, slightly 
smaller than that of Reed (2008); positive 
productive spending effect; sales and 
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taxes; corporate income taxes; 
sales taxes; property taxes; state 
and local expenditures net of 
welfare payments 
property taxes have a negative effect, no 
effect of personal income tax, 
heterogeneous effects across states in the 
short run 
Goff et al. (2012) 1977 to 2005; 
lower 48 states 
annual; per capita 
gross state product 
growth 
FBB approach; overall state tax 
burden; separate variables for 
personal and corporate income 
taxes; matched pairs of states 
relative to state government expenditures 
generally, a greater tax burden slightly 
reduces growth, a result generally holding 
true for personal income taxes but not 
corporate income taxes 
Thompson and Rohlin 
(2012) 
2004-2009, 
border counties 
of 47 states 
employment; 
payroll; hiring 
state sales tax negative effects on employment, payroll 
and new hiring 
Yu and Rickman (2013) 1990 to 2000; 
nonmetropolitan 
counties lower 
48 states 
ten-year growth; 
labor earnings and 
housing costs 
FBB approach; numerous 
categories of taxes and state 
expenditures are included with 
the omitted category consisting 
of intergovernmental revenues, 
non-general revenues, non-
general expenditures, and 
welfare expenditures 
personal income taxes, property, sales and 
corporate taxes negatively affected 
household amenity attractiveness, as did 
spending on education, health and 
government administration;  positive 
effect on amenity attractiveness from 
spending on highways, the environment 
and housing  
Rohlin et al. (2014) 2002-2005, 
border counties, 
lower 48 states 
newly created 
enterprises 
per capita state government 
expenditures; maximum 
corporate and personal income 
tax rates; sales tax rate 
new businesses locate so as to avoid 
higher taxes 
Gale et al. (2015) 1977 to 2011; 
lower 48 states 
five-year changes; 
real per capita 
income growth; 
employment; firm 
formation 
FBB approach; average state and 
local tax burden is separated into 
components; omitted category 
mostly consisting of spending on 
government administration and 
education 
effect of overall tax burden is negative for 
1977-1991 but positive for 1992-2006; 
negative income growth effects of 
property taxes, welfare spending; positive 
effect of corporate income taxes; no effect 
of spending on airports, highways and 
transit utilities or top marginal personal 
income tax rate; property tax reduced 
employment growth and firm formation  
Borcher et al. (2016) 1989-2011; all 
states 
small and large 
business growth 
top marginal personal and 
corporate income tax rates; sales 
tax rate; inheritance, estate and 
sales and corporate 
income taxes reduce small business 
growth; taxes do not influence large 
37 
 
gift tax business growth 
 
Conroy et al. (2016) 2000-2011; 
states 
number of 
manufacturing 
firms that changed 
state of location 
FBB approach; personal and 
corporate income taxes; property 
taxes; spending on primary and 
secondary education, higher 
education, corrections, highways 
and welfare. 
higher education spending attracts firms, 
though the reverse is true for primary and 
secondary education spending and higher 
personal income taxes; effects vary with 
research and development spending type 
Ljungqvist and 
Smolyansky (2016) 
1970 to 2010; 
border counties 
annual; 
employment; wage 
and salary income 
top marginal corporate income 
tax 
negative effects of corporate tax rate 
increases, but no positive effects of tax 
cuts except during recessions 
Peltzman (2016) 1975-2012, 
border counties 
annual 
employment; wage 
rate; number of 
business 
establishments 
tax revenue; own source general 
revenue; direct general 
expenditures from own sources; 
total direct expenditures 
negative effects on aggregate economic 
activity from fiscal expansion, including 
reduced job quality  
Segura (2017) 1977 to 2012; 
lower 48 states 
annual; private 
gross state product 
growth 
FBB approach; spending is 
aggregated into investment, 
services or administration; 
property, sales, income taxes 
plus general charges together 
equal aggregate own-source 
revenues; budget deficit 
increases in corporate income tax rates 
reduce employment and income in the 
counties affected by the tax cut, though 
the effects are small 
Anderson and Bernard 
(2017) 
1999 to 2013; 
lower 48 states  
regression, five-
year changes; real 
per capita gross 
state product 
total state and local tax burden; 
property, sales, individual 
income and corporate income tax 
burdens 
positive effect of corporate tax rate; 
negative effect of sales tax and personal 
income tax (weakly); sensitive to time 
period of analysis 
Ojede et al. (2017) 1971 to 2005; 
lower 48 states 
annual; real per 
capita income 
growth 
FBB approach; tax burden, 
personal income tax, corporate 
income tax, deficit; spending on 
higher education and highways 
regardless of  financing source, productive 
higher education and highway spending 
have statistically significant positive 
effects 
Moretti and Wilson 
(2017) 
1976 to 2010; 
“star scientists”; 
all states 
annual; 
individuals; 
migration 
corporate income tax, personal 
income tax of high-income 
earners 
increases in personal income or corporate 
income tax rates reduce net in-migration 
Girard and Rauh (2017) 1977-2011; 
business 
annual; number of 
business 
corporate income tax, gross 
receipts tax, or other; sales tax, 
negative effect of corporate taxes on 
number of establishments and  employees, 
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establish. all 
states & Wash. 
D.C. 
establishments; 
employees; capital 
per establishment 
property tax, personal income 
tax 
and  capital per plant; pass-through 
entities respond similarly to changes in 
personal tax rates 
Zidar (2017) 1950-2011; 
individual data, 
all states 
annual; 
employment 
growth 
exogenous federal tax changes 
and variation in the income 
distribution 
tax increase for bottom ninety percent of 
the income distribution reduced 
employment growth, while there is no 
effect for an equivalent-sized tax cut for 
the top ten percent  
Case Studies 
Study Sample Empirical 
Approach 
Fiscal Variables  Findings 
Denaux (2007) 1980 to 1995; 
North Carolina 
counties 
five-year averages; 
real per capita 
income growth 
FBB approach; personal income, 
corporate income, property, sales 
and gasoline taxes; 
primary/secondary education, 
higher education, and highways; 
transfer payments are in the 
omitted category 
corporate taxes reduces income growth, 
while higher education spending and 
personal income taxes increases growth; 
sales taxes, property taxes K-12 spending 
did not affect growth 
Wooster and Lerner 
(2010) 
1992 to 2006; 
Washington 
counties 
annual; real per 
capita retail sales 
combined state and local sales 
tax 
differences in the state and local sales 
taxes in Washington’s border counties 
with those in Idaho and Oregon reduces 
real per capita retail sales 
Young and Varner 
(2011) 
2004-2007 
relative to 2000-
2003; high-
income earners 
in New Jersey 
four-year periods; 
net out-migration 
top marginal income tax rate only is statistically significant net out-
migration of retirees and those in the top 
0.1 percent who receive all their income 
from investments 
Varner and Young 
(2012) 
1994-2007; high 
income earners 
in California 
annual; in- and 
out-migration 
1996 tax cut on high incomes; 
2005 Mental Health Services 
Tax on high incomes 
absence of a significant consistent effect 
on in-migration or out-migration from 
either tax change 
Rickman (2013) 1990 to 2010; 
counties in 
Oklahoma and 
neighboring 
states 
ten-year changes; 
manufacturing 
employment, total 
employment, 
population, real 
per capita income, 
state binary indicator variables 
reflecting differences after 
extensive control variables 
Texas manufacturing employment and 
population during 1990-2000 and total 
employment during 2000-2010 grew 
faster than Oklahoma’s; Oklahoma’s 
growth more often was stronger than that 
of Arkansas, Kansas and Missouri during 
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real private 
domestic product 
per employee    
the 2000-2010; per capita income grew 
faster in Oklahoma compared to that in 
Colorado during 2000-2010, but slower 
compared to New Mexico 
Cohen et al. (2015) 2004-2007 
relative to 2000-
2003; high 
income earners 
in New Jersey 
four-year periods; 
out-migration 
top marginal income tax rate statistically significant effect on out-
migration; small budgetary impact though 
Wang (2016) 2000 to 
2006/2010; 
PUMAs; 
Oklahoma & 
Texas compared 
levels and ten-year 
changes; wages 
and housing costs 
state binary indicator variables 
reflecting differences after 
extensive control variables 
only fiscal policy difference found for 
Texas relative to Oklahoma is the 
relatively lower household amenity 
attractiveness of the policies in Texas 
nonmetropolitan areas; no significant 
growth differences are found between the 
two states.  
Rickman and Wang 
(2018) 
2011-2015 less 
2006-2011; 
Kansas & 
Wisconsin 
difference-in-
differences; per 
capita income, 
total employment, 
real gross state 
product, poverty 
rate; housing 
price; median 
household income; 
labor 
force/population; 
population 
timing of tax and expenditure 
cuts post-2011 in treated state 
versus counterfactual 
comparison 
total wage and salary nonfarm 
employment grew significantly slower in 
Kansas and Wisconsin relative to their 
control groups, particularly for Kansas;  
only for two indictors did Wisconsin 
outperform the control group and only for 
one indicator did Kansas outperform its 
control group; real per capita state and 
local expenditures grew slower in Kansas 
and Wisconsin relative to that in their 
respective control groups, especially for 
state and local construction expenditures 
in Kansas and state and local educations 
expenditures in Wisconsin 
Turner and Blagg( 2017) 2004-2014; 
counties in 
Kansas and 
bordering states 
difference-in-
differences; 
private sector 
employment; full-
sample and border 
matching samples 
comparison of pre- and post-tax 
cut periods in Kansas counties 
and those in bordering states 
small relative reduction in private 
establishment employment and no change 
in proprietor employment in Kansas 
 
40 
 
Table 2. Summary of State and Local Fiscal Policy Studies Reviewed Part 2 
Nationwide Studies 
Study Spatial Spillovers Heterogeneity Control Variables Accounting for Endogeneity  
Brown et al. (2003) no no industrial Mix, unemployment rate instrumental variables 
Harden and Hoyt (2003) yes, statistically 
insignificant 
yes 
(geography) 
educational attainment, input costs, 
female labor force participation rate  
lagged values of taxes and 
expenditures and instrumental 
variables estimation 
Holcombe and Lacombe 
(2004) 
no no business climate ranking; manufacturing 
and mining influence; population; per 
capita income; median age 
no 
Tomljanovich (2004) no no none addition of leads and lags  
Bania et al. (2007) no yes 
(geography) 
age 18–64 population percentage; union 
membership; budget balance/personal 
income; unemployment– 
compensation/personal income 
GMM estimation 
Taylor and Brown 
(2006) 
no yes (time) Industrial mix; unemployment rate no 
Conway and Rork 
(2006) 
yes, no effect no median house value; manufacturing 
wage; unemployment rate; crime rate; 
population 65 and over 
lagged values of taxes 
Agostini (2007) no no total population; road miles/land area; 
real wage rate; energy price 
instrumental variables 
Hammond and 
Thompson (2008) 
no yes 
(geography) 
fuel and electricity prices; unionization; 
natural amenity variables; 
universities/colleges; death rate 
nonlinear two stage least squares 
Bania and Stone (2008) no yes 
(geography) 
union membership; budget 
balance/personal income; 
unemployment– 
compensation/personal income 
GMM estimation 
Coomes and Hoyt (2008) no yes (political) state’s employment share of metropolitan 
area; median income 
lagged values of taxes and 
expenditures 
Reed (2008) no no education; age structure; race, gender; 
population; urbanization; industry 
structure; unionization 
lagged values of tax burden 
Reed (2009) no no education; age structure; race, gender; 
population; urbanization; industry 
lagged values of  tax burden 
41 
 
structure; unionization;  
Felix (2009) no yes (time) demographic variables; occupation, 
industry, weather, Census division; 
physicians per 100,000 civilian 
population; student-to-teacher ratio 
no 
Deskins and Hill (2010) no yes 
(time) 
population; wage rate/median income; 
population; energy price; unemployment 
rate; industry composition; age structure; 
gross state product; employment 
specification of growth 
Goetz et al. (2011) no no per capita income; percent the state 
population in a metropolitan area; natural 
amenity attractiveness;  high school 
attainment among the adult population 
beginning-period values of 
explanatory variables 
Gius (2011) no yes 
(individuals, 
time) 
age; gender; race; urban residence; 
educational attainment; number of 
people in household; household income; 
unemployment rate change; employment 
status 
no 
Alm and Rogers (2011) no no groups of demographic, geographic 
variables, political and national 
variables; specification searches 
one-year lags of explanatory 
variables 
Bauer et al. (2012) no yes (time) infrastructure expenditures, climate, 
industry structure and education; lagged 
per capita income 
five-year lags of explanatory 
variables 
Bruce and Deskins 
(2012) 
no no unemployment rate; median 
income; poverty rate; population 
density; age; college attainment; industry 
composition; job growth rate 
one-year lags of explanatory 
variables 
Ojede and Yamarik 
(2012) 
no yes 
(geography) 
private investment/personal income; 
nonfarm employment growth 
no 
Goff et al. (2012) no no right-to-work status; a regulatory index; 
beginning period per capita gross state 
product; miles of coastline/land area; 
college attainment 
no 
Thompson and Rohlin 
(2012) 
no yes 
(geography) 
changes in the sales tax treatment of 
food; gender; age 
use of state sales tax for border 
counties 
Yu and Rickman (2013) yes no demographic variables; housing instrumental variables 
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characteristics 
Rohlin et al. (2014) no no land area two-year lags of tax and expenditure 
variables 
Gale et al. (2015) yes yes 
(geography, 
time) 
unemployment rate; population density; 
political/institutional dummy variables; 
tax expenditure limitation dummy 
one-year lags of revenue variables 
Borcher et al. (2016) no yes (business 
size) 
beginning level of small business 
activity; unemployment rate; median 
income; poverty rate; population 
density; age; college attainment; industry 
composition 
one-year lag of explanatory variables 
Conroy et al. (2016) yes yes (research 
and 
development 
spending) 
political variables; college attainment; 
competitiveness index; manufacturing 
employment share in state; state share of 
national manufacturing gross product; 
manufacturing wage; electricity rate; 
unionization; unemployment rate 
lagged explanatory variables 
Ljungqvist and 
Smolyansky (2016) 
yes yes none beginning-year tax variable-ending-
year outcome 
Peltzman (2016) yes yes 
(geography) 
industry composition use of statewide fiscal measures for 
border counties; reverse causality test  
Segura (2017) yes yes none GMM estimation 
Anderson and Bernard 
(2017) 
yes no control variables of Reed (2008) no 
Ojede et al. (2017) yes no state private investment share; non-farm 
civilian employment growth; 
unionization  
lags of fiscal variables; endogeneity 
tests 
Moretti and Wilson 
(2017) 
no no unemployment rate; population growth check pre-existing trends and 
subsequent tax changes 
Giroud and Rauh (2017) no yes (industry) unemployment insurance; state sales tax 
rates, a coarse estimate of property tax 
burdens; and an index of business 
tax incentives 
narrative approach of Romer and 
Romer (2010) 
Zidar (2017) no yes 
(geography) 
oil prices, real interest rates; 
contemporaneous policy and spending 
changes 
exogenous changes in federal tax 
rates and state outcomes 
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Case Studies 
Study     
Denaux (2007) no yes 
(geography) 
initial income; infant mortality rate; real 
stock value of roads/land area 
no 
Wooster and Lehner 
(2010) 
no yes 
(geography) 
real per capita income; travel cost proxy; 
unemployment rate; percentages of the 
population that are either over 65 or 
younger than 18; number of retail 
establishments per 1,000 residents 
no 
Young and Varner 
(2011) 
no yes 
(geography) 
none no 
Varner and Young 
(2012) 
no yes 
(geography) 
none no 
Rickman (2013) no yes 
(geography, 
time) 
natural amenity attractiveness; 
urbanization; industry specialization; and 
immigration 
no 
Cohen et al. (2015) no yes 
(geography) 
none no 
Wang (2016) no yes 
(geography, 
time) 
natural amenity attractiveness; 
urbanization; industry specialization; and 
immigration; household and housing 
characteristics 
no 
Rickman and Wang 
(2018) 
no yes 
(geography) 
predictor variables in creating the 
synthetic control 
check pre-existing trends 
Turner and Blagg( 2017) no yes 
(geography, 
time) 
population; corporate tax rate; sales tax 
rate  
no 
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  Table 3. Change in Rank by Fiscal Variable: 2011-2015 
Fiscal Revenue Category/State CA KS ME MN OH WI 
Own Source Revenues 29 22 27 16 26 44 
Personal Income Taxes 2 50 45 3 49 46 
Sales Taxes 43 11 8 15 2 30 
Corporate Income Taxes 48 4 46 9 43 25 
Property Taxes 44 29 3 43 21 50 
Miscellaneous Revenues 34 32 31 30 22 9 
Total State and Local Expenditures 35 16 39 22 44 31 
Education Expenditures 30 9 37 23 42 40 
Transportation Expenditures 25 14 41 11 12 16 
Public Welfare Expenditures 7 31 48 29 50 22 
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   Table 4. State Weights in Construction of Synthetic Control Units 
 CA KS ME MN OH WI 
AL 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.10 0.00 
AZ 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CT 0.13 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DE 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.03 
FL 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GA 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ID 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
IL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.00 
IN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.19 0.14 
IA 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.30 
KY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MD 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MA 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 
MI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.30 0.08 
MS 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MO 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NE 0.06 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.00 
NH 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.05 0.00 0.27 
NJ 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.00 
NY 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.00 
NC 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 
OR 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PA 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.03 
RI 0.06 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.05 
SC 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SD 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.00 
TN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 
UT 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
VT 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.05 
VA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WA 0.09 0.17 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 
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  Table 5. Change in Rank by Fiscal Variable Relative to the Synthetic Control: 2011-2015 
Fiscal Revenue Category/State CA KS ME MN OH WI 
Own Source Revenues 
-3 0 -5 -16 -3 24 
Personal Income Taxes 
-22 19 21 -21 24 16 
Sales Taxes 
10 -12 -25 -18 -29 4 
Corporate Income Taxes 
20 -22 18 -19 29 7 
Property Taxes 
11 11 -30 10 -9 29 
Miscellaneous Revenues 
8 9 5 4 -8 -15 
Total State and Local Expenditures 
4 -10 8 -9 17 10 
Education Expenditures 
10 -12 17 3 12 18 
Transportation Expenditures 
-3 -16 13 -17 -13 -6 
Public Welfare Expenditures 
-21 0 20 1 27 -2 
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